Licenses and Ratings

Syed Mohammad Husain, 
Address: 1 Anand Road, Upper Mall, Lahore, 
Name and Address of Employer: Pakistan International Airlines Corporation.

Date of Original Issue Aug 3, 1968
Number of Licence 445
Type of Licence:  F.R.T.O. (Flight Radio Telephone Operator)

Date of Original Issue Aug 3, 1968
Number of Licence: 748 
Type of Licence:  Private Pilot 

Date of Original Issue June 17, 1969 
Number of Licence:  442
Type of Licence:  Commercial Pilot 

Date of Original Issue July 8, 1975 
Number of Licence:  441
Type of Licence:  Airline Transport Pilot 

Date of Original Issue: Nov 18, 1982
Number of Rating 2336211
Type of Licence: Airline Transport Pilot-FAA

Date of Original Issue: Oct.22 1995
Number 563
Type of Licence: Flight Operation Officer

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Illusions Leading to Spatial Disorientation

Various complex motions and forces and certain visual scenes encountered in flight can create illusions of motion and position. Spatial disorientation from these illusions can be prevented only by visual reference to reliable, fixed points on the ground or to flight instruments.

The leans: An abrupt correction of a banked attitude, which has been entered too slowly to stimulate the motion sensing system in the inner ear, can create the illusion of banking in the opposite direction. The disoriented pilot will roll the aircraft back into its original dangerous attitude, or if level flight is maintained, will feel compelled to lean in the perceived vertical plane until this illusion subsides.

Coriolis illusion: an abrupt head movement in a prolonged constant-rate turn that has ceased stimulating the motion sensing system can create the illusion of rotation or movement in an entirely different axis. The disoriented pilot will maneuver the aircraft into a dangerous attitude in an attempt to stop rotation. This most overwhelming of all illusions in flight may be prevented by not making sudden, extreme head movements, particularly while making prolonged constant-rate turns under IFR conditions.

Graveyard spin: a proper recovery from a spin that has ceased stimulating the motion sensing system can create the illusion of spinning in the opposite direction. The disoriented pilot will return the aircraft to its original spin.

Graveyard spiral: an observed loss of altitude during a coordinated constant-rate turn that has ceased stimulating the motion sensing system can create the illusion of being in a descent with the wings level. The disoriented pilot will pull back on the controls, tightening the spiral and increasing the loss of altitude.

Somatogravic illusion: a rapid acceleration during takeoff can create the illusion of being in a nose up attitude. The disoriented pilot will push the aircraft into a nose low, or dive attitude. A rapid deceleration by a quick reduction of the throttles can have the opposite effect, with the disoriented pilot pulling the aircraft into a nose up, or stall attitude.

Inversion illusion: an abrupt change from climb to straight and level flight can create the illusion of tumbling backwards. The disoriented pilot will push the aircraft abruptly into a nose low attitude, possibly intensifying this illusion.

Elevator illusion: an abrupt upward vertical acceleration, usually by an updraft, can create the illusion of being in a climb. The disoriented pilot will push the aircraft into a nose low attitude. An abrupt downward vertical acceleration, usually by a downdraft, has the opposite effect, with the disoriented pilot pulling the aircraft into a nose up attitude.

False horizon: sloping cloud formations, an obscured horizon, a dark scene spread with ground lights and stars, and certain geometric patterns of ground light can create illusions of not being aligned correctly with the actual horizon. The disoriented pilot will place the aircraft in a dangerous attitude.

Autokinesis: in the dark, a static light will appear to move about when stared at for many seconds. The disoriented pilot will lose control of the aircraft in attempting to align it with the light

Runway width illusion: a narrower-than-usual runway can create the illusion that the aircraft is at a higher altitude than it actually is. The pilot who does not recognize this illusion will fly a lower approach, with the risk of striking objects along the approach path or landing short. A wider-than-usual runway can have the opposite effect, with the risk of leveling out high and landing hard or overshooting the runway.

Runway and terrain slopes illusion: an upsloping runway, upsloping terrain, or both, can create the illusion that the aircraft is at a higher altitude than it actually is. The pilot who does not recognize this illusion will fly a lower approach. A downsloping runway, downsloping approach terrain, or both, can have the opposite effect.

Featureless terrain illusion: an absence of ground features, as when landing over water, darkened areas, and terrain made featureless by snow, can create the illusion that the aircraft is at a higher altitude than it actually is. The pilot who does not recognize this illusion will fly a lower approach.

Atmospheric illusions: rain on the windscreen can create the illusion of greater height, and atmospheric haze the illusion of being at a greater distance from the runway. The pilot who does not recognize these illusions will fly a lower approach. Penetration of fog can create the illusion of pitching up. The pilot who does not recognize this illusion will steepen the approach, often quite abruptly.

Ground lighting illusions: lights along a straight path, such as a road, and even lights on moving trains can be mistaken for runway and approach lights. Bright runway and approach lighting systems, especially where few lights illuminate the surrounding terrain, may create the illusion of less distance to the runway. The pilot who does not recognize this illusion will fly a higher approach. Conversely, the pilot overflying terrain which has few lights to provide height cues may make a lower than normal approach.

Courtesy: FAA

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Nawaz Sharif and Musharraf

Nawaz Sharif and Musharraf.

The air piracy drama staged by the Government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif could not have been carried out without the  cooperation of DGCAA. It is immaterial who issued that order. The facilitation by the head of Civil Aviation via Air Traffic Control Karachi through unlawful commands to the captain in flight, were contrary to flight safety and endangered the lives of everybody on board. He could have walked away from the job at that order.

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Flying Career

Initiation Lahore Flying Club

  • Aptitude Assessment 18/3/1967—16/4/1967
  • Total Time: 10.00
  • PIA Flying Academy flying started 13/2/1968
  • First Solo: 5/3/1968
  • Total Time: 10+14= 24.00

 

  • PPL #748 (3/8/1968)
  • FRTO # 445 (3/8/1968)
  • Dual Day: 35.05
  • Solo Day: 28.45
  • Navigation Dual: 04.00
  • Total Time: 67.50
  • Nav 2—14/11/1968, KHI-SUJAWAL-MULLA KATIAR-SARI SING-KHI, Instructor Haider Baluch, AP-ATE, 02.15
  • Nav 2—19/11/1968, KHI-T.B. KHAN-MIRPUR BATORO-KHI, Instructor Mahmood, AP-ATZ, 01.45
  • Nav 2—27/11/1968, KHI-MIRPUR BATORO-BHOLARI-SARI SING-KHI, Instructor G/Capt M.J. Khan, AP-ATD, 02.10
  • Nav 2—28/11/1968, KHI-MATLI-SUJAWAL-KHI, Instructor G/Capt M.J. Khan, AP-ATZ, 02.25
  • Nav 3—29/11/1968, KHI-SUJAWAL-MULLA KATIAR-T.B. KHAN-KHI, Self, AP-ATZ, 02.25
  • Nav 3—2/12/1968, KHI-THATTA-MULLA KATIAR-JUNGSHAHI-KHI, Self, AP-ATB, 02.15
  • Nav 3—2/12/1968, KHI-THATTA-MULLA KATIAR-JUNGSHAHI-KHI, Self, AP-ATE, 02.05
  • Nav 3—3/12/1968, KHI-MATIARI-SUJAWAL-KHI, Self, AP-ATE, 02.45
  • Nav 3—4/12/1968, KHI-MIRPUR BATORO-PETARO-GHARO-KHI, Self, AP-ATE, 02.55
  • Nav 3—5/12/1968, KHI-GHARO-PETARO-MIRPUR BATORO-KHI, Self, AP-ATE, 02.55
  • Nav 3—6/12/1968, KHI-T.B. KHAN-T.M. KHAN-MIRPUR BATORO-KHI, Self, AP-ATE, 02.45
  • Nav 3—6/12/1968, KHI-KALU KUHAR-T.B. KHAN-PETARO-PIR PATHO-KHI, Self, AP-ATB, 02.45
  • Nav 3—21/1/1969, KHI-SUJAWAL-HYDERABAD-KHI, Self, AP-ATD, 02.35
  • Nav 3—22/1/1969, KHI-THATTA-HYDERABAD-KHI, Self, AP-ATD, 02.05
  • Nav 3—23/1/1969, KHI-BHOLARI-SUJAWAL-KHI, Self, AP-ATD, 02.25
  • Nav 3—24/1/1969, KHI-SUJAWAL-BHOLARI-KHI, Self, AP-ATD, 02.40
  • 25/3/1969, KHI-LOCAL, Cessna 310B, AP-AKP, Instructor F.H.K. Ghori, 01.10
  • 25/3/1969, KHI-LOCAL, Cessna 310B, AP-AKP, Instructor F.H.K. Ghori, 01.05
  • 1/4/1969, KHI-LOCAL, Cessna 310B, AP-AKP, Instructor F.H.K. Ghori, 00.50
  • FINAL NAV TEST—2/4/1969, KHI-SUJAWAL-JHIMPIR-KHI, Instructor F.H.K. Ghori, AP-ATB, 01.55
  • FINAL HANDLING TEST–9/4/1969, KHI-LOCAL, Instructor F.H.K. Ghori, AP-ATD, 01.00
  • IR CHECK 5/5/1969, KHI-LOCAL, Cessna 310B, AP-AKP, Instructor Manzoor, 01.30
  • Dual Day: 81.30
  • Solo Day: 94.00
  • Night Dual: 02.25
  • Night Solo: 02.35
  • Navigation Dual Day: 14.30
  • Navigation Day Solo: 30.35
  • TTL: 225.35
  • CPL # 442 awarded 17/6/1969

The following cities and towns of the province of Sind, Pakistan were flown by us on the Navigation forays
KHI
PIR PATHO
SUJAWAL
THATTA
GHARO
KALU KUHAR
MIRPUR BATORO
SARI SING
THANA BULLA KHAN
JUNGSHAHI
MULLA KATIAR
BHOLARI
MATLI
PETARO
HYDERABAD
MATIARI
THANA MOHAMMAD KHAN
AP-ATZ, AP-ATB, AP-ATE, AP-ATB were Cessna 150s
AP-AKP was a Cessna 310B

Experience
When & where did you receive your professional flying training?

  • PIA Karachi May 1967 to Dec 1985
  • United Airlines Denver CO Feb/ Mar 1977
  • PIA Training Centre June 1990 to Aug 1994

Licences

  • PPL #748 Aug 3 1968
  • FRTO #445 Aug 3 1968
  • CPL #442 June 17 1969
  • ATPL #441 July 3 1975
  • ATP #2336211 Nov 1982
  • FOO Licence #563 Oct 22 1995

Note:
PPL = Private Pilot’s Licence
CPL = Commercial Pilot Licence
ATPL = Airline Transport Pilot’s Licence
ATP (USA) Airline Transport Pilot
FOO Licence = Flight Operation Officer’s Licence
FRTO = Flight Radio Telephony Operator’s Licence

Group A-Aircraft with MTOGW above 25, 000 Kgs (Multi eng turbojet or turboprop)
Hours Flown on Aircraft Type

  • B707/720B Airline (PIA) Commander P1 = 2566.8, Date of Last Flight 12/12/1985
  • B707/720B Airline (PIA) Copilot P2 = 1030.1, Date of last flight 08/01/1980
  • B747-282B Airline (PIA) Copilot P2 = 1493.5, Date of last flight 04/12/1980
  • B747-100 Airline (UA) Copilot P2 = 02.00, Date of last flight 03/27/1977

Group Total A = 5092.4

Group B—Aircraft other than above
Hours flown on Aircraft Type

  • Fokker F-27 Airline (PIA) Commander P1= 500.2, Date of last flight 04/18/1976
  • Fokker F-27 Airline (PIA) Copilot P2 = 1278.7, Date of last flight 02/09/1975
  • Cessna 310B Airline (PIA) P3 = 5.4, Date of last flight 04/01/1969
  • Cessna 150 Airline (PIA) P1= 151.1, Date of last flight 02/14/1975
  • Cessna 150 Airline (PIA) P3= 94.0, Date of last flight 05/08/1969
  • Cessna 177RG ( Long Island NY) P3 = 2.0, Date of last flight 11/18/1982
  • Grumman Cougar PA-7 (Cranfield UK) P3 = 5.0, Date of last flight 08/18/1983

Note:
MTOGW = Maximum Take Off Gross Weight
Group Total B = 2036.4
Grand TTL = 7128.8

Command Training Fokker F-27

  • 03/04/1975 AP-ALW, F.H.K. Ghori, P3, KHI-KHI, 1500-2000, Night Second = 0110, IF= 0010
  • 03/10/1975 AP-ATO, F.H.K. Ghori, P3, KHI-KHI, 1230-1630, Night Second= 0110, IF= 0100
  • 03/18/1975 AP-ATU, T.H. Naqvi, KHI-KHI, 1455-1745, Night Second = 0100, IF = 0030
  • 03/28/1975 AP-ATU, F.H.K. Ghori, P3, KHI-KHI, 1450-1715, Night Second = 0110, IF = 0025
  • 03/31/1975 AP-ALW, F.H.K. Ghori, P3, KHI-KHI, 1435-1910, Night Second 0120, IF = 0020
  • 04/01/1975 AP-ALW, F.H.K. Ghori, P3, KHI-KHI, 1200-1555, Night Second = 0120, IF = 0030
  • 04/06/1975 AP-ALW, Dara, KHI-KHI, P3, 1500-1805, Night Second = 0100, IF = 0020
  • 04/10/1975 AP-ATO, F.H.K. Ghori, KHI-KHI, P3, 1230-1630, Night Second = 0110, IF = 0020
  • 04/11/1975 AP-ALW, Dara, KHI-KHI, 1430-1745, P3, Night Second = 0155, IF = 0100
  • 04/25/1975 AP-ALW, F.H.K. Ghori, KHI-KHI, P3, 2105-0015, Night Second = 0135, IF = 0030
  • 04/27/1975 AP-ATO, F.H.K. Ghori, KHI-KHI, P3, 1430-1745, Night Second = 0115, IF = 0020 Pre-Rating Check
  • 04/28/1975 AP-ALW, T.H. Naqvi, KHI-KHI, P3, 1415-1620, Night Second = 0205, IF = 0040 Command Check
  • 05/01/1975 AP-ATU, T.H. Naqvi, P2, KHI-PJG-PSI-GWD-PSI-PJG-KHI, Day Second = 0530, Initial Route Command Check

From 05/12/1975 to 07/02/1975, 100 hours as P1 U/S (under supervision) with following captains, F.H.K.Ghori, Aqeel, Razi to the following stations: Mohenjo Daro, Jiwani, Pasni, Panjgur, Hyderabad, Multan, Gwadar, Muscat (Oman), Sukkur, Sui and Nawabshah.

  • 07/03/1975 AP-ATU Self (P1) KHI-MUX-KHI, 1240-1740, Day In charge 0140, Night In charge 0250, IF 0015 First Command Flight

Command Training B707/720B

  • 07/21/1980 AP-AXL, Shaukat Ali, P2, KHI-KHI, 1600-1645, Night Second = 0045
  • 07/22/1980 AP-ATQ, Shaukat Ali, P2, KHI-KHI, 1735-1900, Night Second = 0045
  • 07/23/1980 AP-BAF, Mughal, P2, KHI-KHI, 1850-1930, Night Second = 0040
  • 07/25/1980 AP-BAF, Mughal, P2, KHI-KHI, 1630-1730, Night Second = 0100 Command Check
  • 07/31/1980 AP-BAA, S. Quraishi, P2, KHI-MCT (Oman), 1412-1605, Day Second = 0018, Night Second = 0135-Technical night stop at Muscat, Oman
  • 08/01/1980 AP-BAA, S. Quraishi, P2, MCT (Oman)-KHI, 0930-1115, Day Second 0145, IF= 0010 Initial Route Command Check

From 08/15/1980 to 09/16/1980, 50 hours as P1 U/S (under supervision) with following captains, S.Quraishi, Najam, Manzoor, Bashar, Ejaz ul Haq, Wajid Shah to following stations: Jeddah, Colombo, Peshawar, Istanbul, Multan, Quetta, Rawalpindi

  • 09/16/1980 AP-ATQ, Dara, P1 U/S, KHI-BOM (Bombay)-KHI, 0203-0345, Day In charge 0142, IF 0010/0550-0740 Day In charge=0150, IF= 0010, Final Route Command Check
  • 09/18/1980 AP-AXM, Self P1, KHI-PEW-KHI, 0950-1135 Day In charge 0145/1225-1425 Day In charge 0110 Night In charge 0050 First Command Flight

Note:
AP-AXL, AP-ATQ, AP-BAF, AP-AXM, AP-AXK, AP-AZP are B720Bs while AP-BAA is a B707
All time is GMT
Format M/D/Y
IF = Instrument Time
Command Training = Training to fly as captain of aircraft (P1)

Airline Route Clearances

  • 10/05/1980 AP-AXL T.R. Mir P1 Karachi-Kuwait-Karachi (RF)
  • 10/11/1980 AP-AXK Dara P1 Karachi-Quetta-Islamabad-Quetta-Karachi Pk326 (RF)

Nairobi

  • 01/29/1981 AP-AXM Suri P1 Karachi-Dubai-Nairobi-Pk 745, (RF)
  • 02/01/1981 AP-AXL Suri P1 Nairobi-Dubai-Karachi-Pk744 (RF)
  • 02/15/1981 AP-AXK Junaidi P1 Karachi-Dubai-Nairobi-Pk743 (RC)
  • 02/19/1981 AP-ATQ Junaidi P1 Nairobi-Dubai-Pk746 (RC)
  • 02/20/1981 AP-ATQ Junaidi P1 Dubai-Karachi-Pk746 (RC)
  • 04/02/1981 AP-AXM Self P1 Karachi-Dubai-Nairobi Pk745
  • 04/06/1981 AP-AXK Self P1 Nairobi-Dubai-Karachi Pk744

European

  • 06/09/1981 AP-AWY Iftekhar P1 Karachi-Damascus (RF)
  • 06/12/1981 AP-AWU Iftekhar P1 Damascus-Amsterdam (RF)
  • 06/13/1981 AP-AXG P1 Iftekhar Amsterdam-London (Heathrow)-Amsterdam (RF)
  • 06/16/1981 AP-AXM P1 Iftekhar Amsterdam-Damascus (RF)
  • 06/23/1981 AP-AXL P1 Iftekhar Damascus-Dubai-Karachi (RF)
  • 07/01/1981 AP-AWU P1 Aqeel Karachi-Damascus (RC)
  • 07/03/1981 AP-AWY P1 Aqeel Damascus-Amsterdam (RC)
  • 07/04/1981 AP-AXG P1 Aqeel Amsterdam-London (Heathrow)-Amsterdam (RC)
  • 07/06/1981 AP-AXG P1 Aqeel Amsterdam-Damascus (RC)
  • 07/11/1981 AP-AXK P1 Aqeel Damascus-Islamabad (RC)
  • 08/03/1981 AP-AXL Self P1 Karachi-Dubai-Damascus
  • 08/05/1981 AP-AWY Self P1 Damascus-Amsterdam
  • 08/08/1981 AP-AZW Self P1 Amsterdam-Damascus
  • 08/13/1981 AP-AWY Self P1 Damascus-Dubai
  • 08/14/1981 AP-AWY Self P1 Dubai-Karachi

Atlantic-New York

  • 10/26/1981 AP-AXL P1 Iftekhar Dubai-Damascus-Amsterdam
  • 10/30/1981 AP-AWY P1 Iftekhar Frankfurt-JFK (RF)
  • 11/02/1981 AP-AWU P1 Iftekhar JFK-Frankfurt (RF)
  • 12/04/1981 AP-AWU P1 S.Quraishi Frankfurt-JFK (RC)
  • 12/07/1981 AP-AWY P1 S. Quraishi JFK-Frankfurt (RC)
  • 03/21/1982 AP-AWY Self P1 Paris (Orly)-Boston (Logan) Pk801
  • 03/22/1982 AP-AWY Self P1 Boston (Logan)-JFK Pk801
  • 03/27/1982 AP-AWU Self P1 JFK-Frankfurt-Pk 806
  • 03/29/1982 AP-AWY Self P1 Frankfurt-Cairo-Pk802

Beijing/Tokyo

  • 04/18/1981 AP-BAA Mansoor E. Khan P1 Karachi-Islamabad Pk752 (RF)
  • 04/19/1981 AP-BAA Mansoor E. Khan P1 Islamabad-Beijing Pk752 (RF)
  • 04/23/1981 AP-AXG Mansoor E. Khan P1 Beijing-Tokyo (Narita) Pk750 (RF)
  • 04/27/1981 AP-BAA Mansoor E. Khan P1 Tokyo (Narita)-Beijing Pk751 (RF)
  • 05/01/1981 AP-AZW Mansoor E. Khan P1 Beijing-Islamabad-Pk753 (RF)
  • 05/21/1981 AP-AXG Osman Khan P1 Karachi-Beijing-Pk750 (RC)
  • 05/24/1981 AP-AZW Osman Khan P1 Beijing Tokyo (Narita)-Pk752 (RC)
  • 05/29/1981 AP-BAA Osman Khan P1 Tokyo (Narita)-Beijing-Pk753 (RC)
  • 06/01/1981 AP-AZW Osman Khan P1 Beijing-Islamabad-Karachi-Pk751 (RC)
  • 04/03/1982 AP-AZW Self P1 Karachi-Islamabad-Pk752
  • 04/04/1982 AP-AZW Self P1 Islamabad-Beijing Pk752
  • 04/08/1982 AP-AXA Self P1 Beijing-Tokyo (Narita)-Pk750
  • 04/09/1982 AP-AXA Self P1 Tokyo (Narita)-Beijing-Pk751
  • 04/12/1982 AP-AXA Self P1 Beijing-Karachi-Pk751

Singapore

  • 06/15/1982 AP-BAA Junaidi P1 Karachi-Kuala Lumpur-Singapore Pk770 (RF)
  • 06/17/1982 AP-AZW Junaidi P1 Singapore-Karachi Pk773 (RF)
  • 08/17/1982 AP-AZW Najam P1 Karachi Kuala Lumpur-Singapore Pk770 (RC)
  • 08/19/1982 AP-AZW Najam P1 Singapore-Karachi Pk773 (RC)
  • 12/28/1982 AP-BAA Self P1 Karachi-Kuala Lumpur-Singapore Pk770
  • 12/30/1982 AP-AXA Self P1 Singapore-Kuala Lumpur-Karachi Pk773

Kathmandu

  • 04/29/1983 AP-AZW Munir Khan P1 Karachi-Kathmandu-Dhaka-Karachi Pk264/265 (RF)
  • 05/24/1983 AP-AZW Self P1 Karachi-Dhaka-Kathmandu-Karachi Pk266/267

Hong Kong

  • 05/05/1982 AP-AWY Iftekhar P1 Karachi-Islamabad-Pk004 (RF)
  • 05/05/1982 AP-AWY Iftekhar P1 Islamabad-Hongkong Pk004 (RF)
  • 05/15/1982 AP-AWY Iftekhar P1 Hongkong-Karachi Pk003 (RF)
  • PIA cargo operation ceased thereafter at Hongkong

First Flights as P1 after clearances

  • Nairobi 04/02/1981 AP-AXM Self P1 Karachi-Dubai-Nairobi Pk745
  • European 08/03/1981 AP-AXL Self P1 Karachi-Dubai-Damascus
  • Atlantic-New York 03/21/1982 AP-AWY Self P1 Paris (Orly)-Boston (Logan) Pk801
  • Beijing-Tokyo 04/03/1982 AP-AZW Self P1 Karachi-Islamabad-Pk752
  • Singapore 12/28/1982 AP-BAA Self P1 Karachi-Kuala Lumpur-
  • Singapore Pk770
  • Kathmandu 05/24/1983 AP-AZW Self P1 Karachi-Dhaka-Kathmandu-Karachi Pk266/26

Note:
RF= Route Familiarization
RC = Route Check
P1 = Pilot in Command

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Bhoja air crash: justice delayed

Bhoja air crash: justice delayed.

Posted in Aviation accident analysis | 1 Comment

Past Reminiscences

Aug 16, 1978, Sector Dubai-Islamabad, Aircraft AP-AYV (Alpha Papa-Alpha Yankee Victor), B747-282B,  1230-1527Z.

It was Ramadan and our arrival at Islamabad was just after Iftar time, i.e.,  sunset. Captain Siraj Ali was flying the sector and made a visual approach for landing on Runway 30 after joining right downwind. He had also broken his fast earlier in the cockpit a little while ago. On final approach after gear and full flaps had been selected, Flight Engineer Hasan alerted me about the aircraft going below the glideslope. I gave the captain a call of one dot below glideslope as we approached the locator outer marker (5 miles out). This was repeated by me at least twice, but all to no avail and the aircraft sank further on the electronic glide slope (descent path) as we continued. I brought my left hand over the power levers implying that I would open power immediately. This resulted in the captain coming out of his trance and pushing the levers for more power. We eventually caught up with the glide slope and landed safely. During the roll out after landing , the captain admonished me for not giving him proper call outs during the approach. I immediately replied that he should refrain from fasting while flying. He kept quiet. The captain on another flight later survived a serious mishap at Islamabad as a result of forgetfulness.

During a flight to Nairobi (Jomo Kenyatta International) on Oct 26, 1976, 1716–2105Z with Capt Shafiq Qadri in a Boeing 720 , AP-ATQ, on sector Jeddah-Nairobi, we were cleared by Nairobi Approach for an “Instrument Arrival Runway 06″, meaning, using the Instrument Landing System (ILS) for Runway 06 via the Golf Golf (GG) radio beacon. Captain Shafiq did a hold (instrument circuit) over Golf Golf radio beacon and proceeded to intercept the ILS 06 procedure, landing safely. While parked in the holding area near the runway and waiting for KLM flight to touch down, we were queried by the tower for the reason for hold over Golf Golg radio beacon as advised to him by the approach controller. Capt Shafiq apologized for this oversight and apparently was let off for didn’t hear anything on the matter after that.

On April 22, 1984, B707, AP-AXA, sector Nairobi-Abu-Dhabi, 1405-1910Z, Pakistan Seven Four Four.
When handed over to Mogadishu Tower by East Air Centre and in contact with them while overflying Somali airspace after departure from Nairobi with First Officer Asrar H. Khan, I heard over the common Radio Telephone (R/T), Mogadishu Tower clearing a Somali flight on a reciprocal (opposite to us) track through our level. We were in clouds and I immediately contacted Mogadishu tower repeating time overheasd Mogadishu with our flight level and also conveying to the reciprocal flight our data, position and flight level. I wrote this up in the debrief and it was taken up by our flight operations department via ICAO with East Air Centre.

Thereafter on many other flights over Somalia, Mogadishu Tower never responded to my transmissions though we stayed alert. There was another frequency 126.7 mHz on which all aircraft used to give blind transmission calls, giving their data to listeners whoever was interested and 121.5, the international distress was sometimes kept selected on the secondary VHF communication receiver.

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Personal torment

On May 9, 1983, with aircraft AP-AZW, a B707-251B with call sign, Pakistan 225 on sector Karachi-Muscat-Bahrain (KHI-MCT-BAH), timings 1635-1815, 1905-2030. All times are Zulu (UTC). Cockpit crew is First Officer Naeem Kazi and Flight Engineer Saeed Memon

After landing and exiting runway 30 (runway direction 301 degrees magnetic) at BAH we were given taxi instructions and alloted a parking bay. This was amended while taxiing and another bay was given.

In the Azimuth Guidance Nose in Parking System (AGNIS) there are two sets of lights to watch, one which is red and green and allows/disallows movement into the bay and the other set which guides you into the bay on the centre line and allows stoppage as the eye aligns with aircraft symbol on the board on your left wall.

According to the ATC controller, I taxied into the bay while the light was red meaning the air jetty was not set up properly to receive the aircraft. As we creeped forward and as I was waiting for the 707 symbol to align on the board, the upper surface of the wing made contact with the building structure causing a 2 x 2 inch tear in the aircraft upper skin.

ATC came on the radio to let me know that the light was red when I came into the bay and this was acknowledged by our call sign (Pakistan two two five). I may be wrong but I think I came in on a green light and nobody else in the cockpit noticed anything unusual.

Passengers were deplaned, those who were getting off here disembarked and those continuing on to Karachi given a different carrier or hotel.

The PIA engineers told me that they could do the job with high speed tape that night but it would be risky. The flight night stopped and Capt Pervaiz Saeed, Chief Pilot B707 was sent in from Karachi to investigate the next day.

You can imagine how I felt that night in the hotel. The Director Flight Operations, Capt. S.S. Akbar was very understanding and let me off tasking my crew for letting the captain fly alone. It took some days to get back to flying as a pilot strike intervened. It was on the initiative of Crew Scheduling Officer Shafiq that the clearance for me to fly was expedited because he approached the Director directly, saying he needed me immediately.

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