Training and route clearances

Initiation at Lahore Flying Club after replying to  pilot trainee advertisement in newspaper in Oct.1966 and selection process. Flying Club hours on Cessna 150 were 10.00

Aptitude Assessment at Lahore Flying Club 18/3/1967—16/4/1967 = 10.00 hours

PIA Flying Academy flying started 13/2/1968

  • First Solo: 5/3/1968= 14.00 hours
  • Total Time: 10+14 (academy hours)= 24.00
  • PPL #748 (3/8/1968)
  • FRTO # 445 (3/8/1968)
  • Dual Day: 35.05
  • Solo Day: 28.45
  • Navigation Dual: 04.00
  • Total Time: 67.50

Navigation 2

  • 14/11/1968, KHI-Sujawal-Mulla Katiar-Sari Sing-KHI, Instructor Hyder Baluch, AP-ATE, 02.15
  • 19/11/1968, KHI-T.B. Khan-Mirpur Batoro-KHI, Instructor Mahmood, AP-ATZ, 01.45
  • 27/11/1968, KHI-Mirpur Batoro-Bholari-Sari Sing-KHI, Instructor Group/Capt. M.J. Khan, AP-ATD, 02.10
  • 28/11/1968, KHI-Matli-Sujawal-KHI, Instructor Group/Capt. M.J. Khan, AP-ATZ, 02.25

Navigation 3

  • 29/11/1968, KHI-Sujawal-Mulla Katiar-T.B. Khan-KHI, Self, AP-ATZ, 02.25
  • 2/12/1968, KHI-Thatta-Mulla Katiar-Jungshahi-KHI, Self, AP-ATB, 02.15
  • 2/12/1968, KHI-Thatta-Mulla Katiar-Jungshahi-KHI, Self, AP-ATE, 02.05
  • 3/12/1968, KHI-Matiari-Sujawal-KHI, Self, AP-ATE, 02.45
  • 4/12/1968, KHI-Mirpur Batoro-Petaro-Gharo-KHI, Self, AP-ATE, 02.55
  • 5/12/1968, KHI-Gharo-Petaro-Mirpur Batoro-KHI, Self, AP-ATE, 02.55
  • 6/12/1968, KHI-T.B. Khan-T.M. Khan-Mirpur Batoro-KHI, Self, AP-ATE, 02.45
  • 6/12/1968, KHI-Kalu Kuhar-T.B. Khan-Petaro-Pir Patho-KHI, Self, AP-ATB, 02.45
  • 21/1/1969, KHI-Sujawal-Hyderabad-KHI, Self, AP-ATD, 02.35
  • 22/1/1969, KHI-Thatta-Hyderabad-KHI, Self, AP-ATD, 02.05
  • 23/1/1969, KHI-Bholari-Sujawal-KHI, Self, AP-ATD, 02.25
  • 24/1/1969, KHI-Sujawal-Bholari-KHI, Self, AP-ATD, 02.4

25/3/1969, KHI-Local, Cessna 310B, AP-AKP, Instructor F.H.K. Ghori, 01.10

25/3/1969, KHI-Local, Cessna 310B, AP-AKP, Instructor F.H.K. Ghori, 01.05

1/4/1969, KHI-Local, Cessna 310B, AP-AKP, Instructor F.H.K. Ghori, 00.50

Final Navigation Test—2/4/1969, KHI-Sujawal-Jhimpir-KHI, Instructor F.H.K. Ghori, AP-ATB, 01.55

Final Handling Test–9/4/1969, KHI-Local, Instructor F.H.K. Ghori, AP-ATD, 01.00

Instrument Rating Check 5/5/1969, KHI-Local, Cessna 310B, AP-AKP, Instructor Manzoor, 01.30

  • Dual Day: 81.30
  • Solo Day: 94.00
  • Night Dual: 02.25
  • Night Solo: 02.35
  • Navigation Dual Day: 14.30
  • Navigation Day Solo: 30.35
  • TTL: 225.35

CPL # 442 awarded 17/6/1969

The following cities and towns of the province of Sind, Pakistan were flown by us on the Navigation forays from KHI (Karachi):

Pir Patho; Sujawal; Thatta; Gharo; Kalu Kuhar; Mirpur Batoro; Sari Sing; Thana Bulla Khan; Jungshahi; Mulla Katiar; Bholari–abandoned WWII airfield; Matli; Petaro; Hyderabad; Matiari; Thana Mohammad Khan

AP-ATZ, AP-ATB, AP-ATE, AP-ATB were Cessna 150s

AP-AKP was a Cessna 310B

Experience: When & where did you receive your professional flying training?

PIA Karachi May 1967 to Dec 1985

United Airlines Denver CO Feb/ Mar 1977

PIA Training Centre June 1990 to Aug 1994

Licences

  • PPL #748 Aug 3 1968
  • FRTO #445 Aug 3 1968
  • CPL #442 June 17 1969
  • ATPL #441 July 3 1975
  • ATP #2336211 Nov 1982
  • FOO #563 Oct 22 1995

Note: PPL = Private Pilot’s Licence CPL = Commercial Pilot Licence ATPL = Airline Transport Pilot’s Licence ATP (USA) Airline Transport Pilot FOO = Flight Operation Officer’s Licence FRTO = Flight Radio Telephony Operator’s Licence

Group A

Aircraft with MTOGW above 25, 000 Kgs (Multi-engine turbojet or turboprop)

Hours Flown on Aircraft Type

  • B707/720B Airline (PIA) Commander P1 = 2566.8, Date of Last Flight 12/12/1985
  • B707/720B Airline (PIA) Copilot P2 = 1030.1, Date of last flight 08/01/1980
  • B747-282B Airline (PIA) Copilot P2 = 1493.5, Date of last flight 04/12/1980
  • B747-100 Airline (UA) Copilot P2 = 02.00, Date of last flight 03/27/1977

Group Total A = 5092.4

Group B

Aircraft other than above

Hours flown on Aircraft Type

  • Fokker F-27 Airline (PIA) Commander P1= 500.2, Date of last flight 04/18/1976
  • Fokker F-27 Airline (PIA) Copilot P2 = 1278.7, Date of last flight 02/09/1975
  • Cessna 310B Airline (PIA) P3 = 5.4, Date of last flight 04/01/1969
  • Cessna 150 Airline (PIA) P1= 151.1, Date of last flight 02/14/1975
  • Cessna 150 Airline (PIA) P3= 94.0, Date of last flight 05/08/1969
  • Cessna 177RG ( Long Island NY) P3 = 2.0, Date of last flight 11/18/1982
  • Grumman Cougar PA-7 (Cranfield UK) P3 = 5.0, Date of last flight 08/18/1983

Note:

  • MTOGW = Maximum Take Off Gross Weight
  • Group Total B = 2036.4
  • Grand TTL = 7128.8
  • RF= Route Familiarization
  • RC = Route Check
  • P1 = Pilot in Command

Command Training Fokker F-27

  • 03/04/1975 AP-ALW, F.H.K. Ghori, P3, KHI-KHI, 1500-2000, Night Second = 0110, IF= 0010
  • 03/10/1975 AP-ATO, F.H.K. Ghori, P3, KHI-KHI, 1230-1630, Night Second= 0110, IF= 0100
  • 03/18/1975 AP-ATU, T.H. Naqvi, KHI-KHI, 1455-1745, Night Second = 0100, IF = 0030
  • 03/28/1975 AP-ATU, F.H.K. Ghori, P3, KHI-KHI, 1450-1715, Night Second = 0110, IF = 0025
  • 03/31/1975 AP-ALW, F.H.K. Ghori, P3, KHI-KHI, 1435-1910, Night Second 0120, IF = 0020
  • 04/01/1975 AP-ALW, F.H.K. Ghori, P3, KHI-KHI, 1200-1555, Night Second = 0120, IF = 0030
  • 04/06/1975 AP-ALW, Dara, KHI-KHI, P3, 1500-1805, Night Second = 0100, IF = 0020
  • 04/10/1975 AP-ATO, F.H.K. Ghori, KHI-KHI, P3, 1230-1630, Night Second = 0110, IF = 0020
  • 04/11/1975 AP-ALW, Dara, KHI-KHI, 1430-1745, P3, Night Second = 0155, IF = 0100
  • 04/25/1975 AP-ALW, F.H.K. Ghori, KHI-KHI, P3, 2105-0015, Night Second = 0135, IF = 0030
  • 04/27/1975 AP-ATO, F.H.K. Ghori, KHI-KHI, P3, 1430-1745, Night Second = 0115, IF = 0020 Pre-Rating Check
  • 04/28/1975 AP-ALW, T.H. Naqvi, KHI-KHI, P3, 1415-1620, Night Second = 0205, IF = 0040 Command Check
  • 05/01/1975 AP-ATU, T.H. Naqvi, P2, KHI-PJG-PSI-GWD-PSI-PJG-KHI, Day Second = 0530, Initial Route Command Check

From 05/12/1975 to 07/02/1975, 100 hours as P1 U/S (under supervision) with following captains, F.H.K.Ghori; Aqeel; Razi to the following stations: Mohenjo Daro, Jiwani, Pasni, Panjgur, Hyderabad, Multan, Gwadar, Muscat (Oman), Sukkur, Sui and Nawabshah.

First Command Flight F-27

  • 07/03/1975 AP-ATU Self (P1) KHI-MUX-KHI, 1240-1740
  • Day In charge 0140, Night In charge 0250, IF 0015

Command Training B707/720B

  • 07/21/1980 AP-AXL, Shaukat Ali, P2, KHI-KHI, 1600-1645, Night Second = 0045
  • 07/22/1980 AP-ATQ, Shaukat Ali, P2, KHI-KHI, 1735-1900, Night Second = 0045
  • 07/23/1980 AP-BAF, Mughal, P2, KHI-KHI, 1850-1930, Night Second = 0040
  • 07/25/1980 AP-BAF, Mughal, P2, KHI-KHI, 1630-1730, Night Second = 0100- Command Check
  • 07/31/1980 AP-BAA, S. Quraishi, P2, KHI-MCT (Oman), 1412-1605, Day Second = 0018, Night Second = 0135-Technical night stop at Muscat, Oman
  • 08/01/1980 AP-BAA, S. Quraishi, P2, MCT (Oman)-KHI, 0930-1115, Day Second 0145, IF= 0010 Initial Route Command Check

From 08/15/1980 to 09/16/1980, 50 hours as P1 U/S (under supervision) with following captains: S.Quraishi; Najam; Manzoor; Bashar, Ejaz ul Haq; Wajid Shah to following stations:

Jeddah; Colombo; Peshawar; Istanbul; Multan; Quetta; Rawalpindi

Final Route Command Check B707

09/16/1980 AP-ATQ, Dara, P1 U/S, KHI-BOM (Bombay)-KHI, 0203-0345, Day In charge 0142, IF 0010/0550-0740 Day In charge=0150, IF= 0010

First Command Flight B707

09/18/1980 AP-AXM, Self P1, KHI-PEW-KHI, 0950-1135 Day In charge 0145/1225-1425 Day In charge 0110 Night In charge 0050

Note

  • AP-AXL, AP-ATQ, AP-BAF, AP-AXM, AP-AXK, AP-AZP were B720s
  • AP-BAA is a B707
  • All time is GMT
  • Format M/D/Y
  • IF = Instrument Time
  • Command Training = training to fly as captain of aircraft (P1)

Airline Route Clearances

  • 10/05/1980 AP-AXL T.R. Mir P1 Karachi-Kuwait-Karachi (RF)
  • 10/11/1980 AP-AXK Dara P1 Karachi-Quetta-Islamabad-Quetta-Karachi Pk326 (RF)

Nairobi

  • 01/29/1981 AP-AXM Suri P1 Karachi-Dubai-Nairobi-Pk 745, RF
  • 02/01/1981 AP-AXL Suri P1 Nairobi-Dubai-Karachi-Pk744 RF
  • 02/15/1981 AP-AXK Junaidi P1 Karachi-Dubai-Nairobi-Pk743 RC
  • 02/19/1981 AP-ATQ Junaidi P1 Nairobi-Dubai-Pk746 RC
  • 02/20/1981 AP-ATQ Junaidi P1 Dubai-Karachi-Pk746 RC
  • 04/02/1981 AP-AXM Self P1 Karachi-Dubai-Nairobi Pk745
  • 04/06/1981 AP-AXK Self P1 Nairobi-Dubai-Karachi Pk744

European

  • 06/09/1981 AP-AWY Iftekhar P1 Karachi-Damascus RF
  • 06/12/1981 AP-AWU Iftekhar P1 Damascus-Amsterdam RF
  • 06/13/1981 AP-AXG P1 Iftekhar Amsterdam-London (Heathrow)-Amsterdam(RF
  • 06/16/1981 AP-AXM P1 Iftekhar Amsterdam-Damascus RF
  • 06/23/1981 AP-AXL P1 Iftekhar Damascus-Dubai-Karachi(RF
  • 07/01/1981 AP-AWU P1 Aqeel Karachi-Damascus RC
  • 07/03/1981 AP-AWY P1 Aqeel Damascus-Amsterdam RC
  • 07/04/1981 AP-AXG P1 Aqeel Amsterdam-London (Heathrow)-Amsterdam RC
  • 07/06/1981 AP-AXG P1 Aqeel Amsterdam-Damascus RC
  • 07/11/1981 AP-AXK P1 Aqeel Damascus-Islamabad RC
  • 08/03/1981 AP-AXL Self P1 Karachi-Dubai-Damascus
  • 08/05/1981 AP-AWY Self P1 Damascus-Amsterdam
  • 08/08/1981 AP-AZW Self P1 Amsterdam-Damascus
  • 08/13/1981 AP-AWY Self P1 Damascus-Dubai
  • 08/14/1981 AP-AWY Self P1 Dubai-Karachi

Atlantic-New York

  • 10/26/1981 AP-AXL P1 Iftekhar Dubai-Damascus-Amsterdam
  • 10/30/1981 AP-AWY P1 Iftekhar Frankfurt-JFK, RF
  • 11/02/1981 AP-AWU P1 Iftekhar JFK-Frankfurt, RF
  • 12/04/1981 AP-AWU P1 S.Quraishi Frankfurt-JFK, RC
  • 12/07/1981 AP-AWY P1 S. Quraishi JFK-Frankfurt, RC
  • 03/21/1982 AP-AWY Self P1 Paris (Orly)-Boston (Logan) Pk801
  • 03/22/1982 AP-AWY Self P1 Boston (Logan)-JFK Pk801
  • 03/27/1982 AP-AWU Self P1 JFK-Frankfurt-Pk 806
  • 03/29/1982 AP-AWY Self P1 Frankfurt-Cairo-Pk802

Beijing/Tokyo

  • 04/18/1981 AP-BAA Mansoor E. Khan P1 Karachi-Islamabad Pk752 RF
  • 04/19/1981 AP-BAA Mansoor E. Khan P1 Islamabad-Beijing Pk752 RF
  • 04/23/1981 AP-AXG Mansoor E. Khan P1 Beijing-Tokyo (Narita) Pk750 RF
  • 04/27/1981 AP-BAA Mansoor E. Khan P1 Tokyo (Narita)-Beijing Pk751 RF
  • 05/01/1981 AP-AZW Mansoor E. Khan P1 Beijing-Islamabad-Pk753 RF
  • 05/21/1981 AP-AXG Osman Khan P1 Karachi-Beijing-Pk750 RC
  • 05/24/1981 AP-AZW Osman Khan P1 Beijing Tokyo (Narita)-Pk752 RC
  • 05/29/1981 AP-BAA Osman Khan P1 Tokyo (Narita)-Beijing-Pk753 RC
  • 06/01/1981 AP-AZW Osman Khan P1 Beijing-Islamabad-Karachi-Pk751 RC
  • 04/03/1982 AP-AZW Self P1 Karachi-Islamabad-Pk752
  • 04/04/1982 AP-AZW Self P1 Islamabad-Beijing Pk752
  • 04/08/1982 AP-AXA Self P1 Beijing-Tokyo (Narita)-Pk750
  • 04/09/1982 AP-AXA Self P1 Tokyo (Narita)-Beijing-Pk751
  • 04/12/1982 AP-AXA Self P1 Beijing-Karachi-Pk751

Singapore

  • 06/15/1982 AP-BAA Junaidi P1 Karachi-Kuala Lumpur-Singapore Pk770 RF
  • 06/17/1982 AP-AZW Junaidi P1 Singapore-Karachi Pk773 RF
  • 08/17/1982 AP-AZW Najam P1 Karachi Kuala Lumpur-Singapore Pk770 RC
  • 08/19/1982 AP-AZW Najam P1 Singapore-Karachi Pk773 RC
  • 12/28/1982 AP-BAA Self P1 Karachi-Kuala Lumpur-Singapore Pk770
  • 12/30/1982 AP-AXA Self P1 Singapore-Kuala Lumpur-Karachi Pk773

Kathmandu

  • 04/29/1983 AP-AZW Munir Khan P1 Karachi-Kathmandu-Dhaka-Karachi Pk264/265 RF
  • 05/24/1983 AP-AZW Self P1 Karachi-Dhaka-Kathmandu-Karachi Pk266/267

Hong Kong

  • 05/05/1982 AP-AWY Iftekhar P1 Karachi-Islamabad-Pk004 RF
  • 05/05/1982 AP-AWY Iftekhar P1 Islamabad-Hongkong Pk004 RF
  • 05/15/1982 AP-AWY Iftekhar P1 Hongkong-Karachi Pk003 RF
  • PIA cargo operation ceased thereafter at Hongkong

First Flights as P1 after clearances

  • Nairobi 04/02/1981,  AP-AXM,  Self P1,  Karachi-Dubai-Nairobi,  Pk745
  • European 08/03/1981 AP-AXL Self P1 Karachi-Dubai-Damascus
  • Atlantic-New York 03/21/1982 AP-AWY Self P1 Orly-Boston Pk801
  • Beijing-Tokyo 04/03/1982 AP-AZW Self P1 Karachi-Islamabad-Pk752
  • Singapore 12/28/1982 AP-BAA Self P1 Karachi-Kuala Lumpur-Singapore, Pk770
  • Kathmandu 05/24/1983 AP-AZW Self P1 Karachi-Dhaka-Kathmandu-Karachi Pk266/267
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The Lost Art of Paying Attention—Susan Parson

AV1

Managing the Attraction to Technological Distraction

Our inventions are wont to be pretty toys, which distract our attention from serious things. They are but improved means to an unimproved end.

— Henry David Thoreau

Several years ago, I had just finished an enjoyable GA glass cockpit flight with an FAA colleague. During the post flight discussion, he made the following observation. “When it comes to programming the avionics, you know these systems as well as anybody I’ve seen. But you probably don’t have any idea how much time you spent heads-down. There was a lot of traffic out there today.”

Gulp. He got my attention — attention that, during the flight, had admittedly been sucked into the vortex of the shiny multi-colored whiz-bang gadgetry at my disposal in the DA-40 Diamond Star we had been flying. Yes, TIS (Traffic Information Service) was available for most of the flight, but I know better than to regard it as a failsafe and foolproof method of collision avoidance. It was sobering to realize that, without even noticing, I had allowed all the pretty toys in the panel to distract my attention far too much from the serious business of see and avoid. Even more sobering was the knowledge that such failure could easily have resulted in some version of Mr. Thoreau’s “unimproved end.” I’ve never forgotten the lesson, nor have I ceased to mentally replay my colleague’s cautionary comment whenever I fly.

As I began to instruct more frequently in glass cockpit aircraft, I noticed that the eyeball and attention vacuum effect of the glass panel technology was not unique to me. My fellow pilots would similarly fixate not just on periodic programming requirements, but also on monitoring the myriad bits and bytes of flight information on the various glass cockpit displays. In an effort to offer them the kind of awareness my colleague gave me, I sometimes used a stopwatch to provide very specific feedback on how long they really spent in the technological time warp. The attraction to technological distractions is even greater now that so many of us have acquired extremely capable tablets stocked with equally capable flight planning, managing, and monitoring apps.

So what’s a safety-conscious pilot to do? Here are a few pitfalls to see and avoid.

It’s painfully easy to succumb to the subtle tyr­anny of technology. The glorious gadgets tempt us to shirk not only our see-and-avoid responsibilities, but also a vast swath of the flight management work. They lull us away from the discipline of critical think­ing and true situation awareness, a term that implies far more than a position check on the moving map. And, as several air carrier accidents in the past few years demonstrate, highly trained and experienced airline pilots are no less vulnerable to over-reliance on technology and the resulting errors in automation management. So what’s a safety-conscious pilot to do? Here are a few pitfalls to see and avoid.

Mistakes Magnified

The first rule of any technology used in a business is that automation applied to an efficient opera­tion will magnify the efficiency. The second is that automation applied to an inefficient operation will magnify the inefficiency.

— Bill Gates

This observation clearly applies to aviation as well as to business. Technology and automation applied to an actively-managed flight can magnify its safety and efficiency, but when applied to a non-managed flight, they can very efficiently get you into very big trouble. That’s because regardless of how good they are, today’s avionics and handheld devices do not have sufficient intelligence to do more than exactly what we command them to do. If we issue the wrong commands because of inattention or incom­plete understanding of the technology, the flight will potentially go off track in every possible way.

Improper understanding and/or poor manage­ment of technology has also contributed to major air carrier accidents. Remember the 1995 B-757 crash near Cali, Columbia? More recently, how about Air France 447, lost over the South Atlantic on a flight from Brazil to Paris? Or Asiana 214, which crashed while attempting to land at SFO last July?

It’s painfully easy to succumb to the subtle tyranny of technology. The glorious gadgets tempt us to shirk not only our see-and-avoid responsibilities, but also a vast swath of the flight management work.

Knowledge is the key to avoiding this particular technology pitfall. You need to know the equipment cold. When I teach use of GPS moving map naviga­tors, I stress the importance of knowing how to pre­cisely navigate both the mechanical structure (aka the “knobology”) and the library structure — that is, how to efficiently find and display the information you need for any given phase of flight. You need to know its normal and abnormal operations, so you can avoid those pesky and potentially dangerous “what’s it doing” situations. You need to know its limitations — what the technology can do for you and, equally important, what functions are simply beyond its capability.

As Kenny Rogers sang in “The Gambler,” you also need to “know when to hold ‘em, and know when to fold ‘em.” If you find yourself baffled, confused, or in any way uncertain about what the technology is doing, it’s time to turn it off and reorient yourself. That certainly applies to the autopilot, but it also includes panel-mount, hand-held, or tablet-based navigators if you don’t understand where they are taking you — or if you have any doubts as to the safety of the suggested course. Never forget that the magenta line can guide you direct to anywhere … including direct through regulatory obstacles (e.g., restricted/prohibited/controlled airspace), man-made obstacles, or natural ones such as terrain.

Role Reversal

There is a real danger that computers will develop intelligence and take over. We urgently need to develop direct connections to the brain so that computers can add to human intelligence rather than be in opposition.

— Stephen Hawking

We are so beguiled by our electronic tools that we expect them to compensate for functions that we cannot perform. We expect the technology to do not just the work, but also the thinking

Even if you’ve never watched 2001: A Space Odyssey, the story of the spacecraft’s domineering computer, HAL 9000, has long since passed into popular culture. HAL asserts that he is “foolproof and incapable of error.” At least initially, the crew is content to believe in HAL’s infallibility and let their computer run the show. And yes, that decision leads to a bad end.

How often are we aviators guilty of the same thing?

There is no dispute about the astonishing capability and reliability of today’s technology. Tablet flight management apps and panel-mount GPS moving map navigators provide an enormous range of information. Even the most modest GA autopilots can often manage stick and rudder duties far more smoothly than many human pilots. What’s not to like?

The problem is that we humans are so beguiled by our electronic tools that we expect them to compensate for functions that we cannot, or choose not, to perform. We expect the technology to do not just the work, but also the thinking. We are too often content to completely relinquish command and control functions to our on-board technologies. In effect, we implicitly delegate our PIC authority, and entrust our very lives, to mere machines.

Because even our best technologies are thankfully not (yet) up to HAL-like intelligence that can actively decide to assume command, both safety and good airmanship demand that we retain the role of PIC, and that we keep the technology under firm control. Never let the airplane or any of the on-board technology do anything you don’t know about, and — as the cliché reminds — never let the airplane or any of its high-tech equipment take you to any place your brain hasn’t already passed through.

AV2

Out of the Loop

I think it’s very important to have a feedback loop, where you’re constantly thinking about what you’ve done and how you could be doing it better. — Elon Musk

Delegating the PIC role to your on-board technology provides a very direct path to loss of situation awareness — more colloquially known as being out of the loop. When I was a student pilot, making my solo cross-country flights in a C152 with only a single nav/com radio, my fear of getting lost motivated a near maniacal focus on positional and situation awareness. In addition to double-, triple-, and quadruple-checking the VOR frequencies and courses, I used pilotage to ensure that I could constantly match features on the ground passing below me to the proper location on my well-worn paper sectional chart.

There is no doubt that GPS provides a much more precise position indication than anything I could have calculated in the pre-moving map Stone Age. Ironically, though, the advent of at-a-glance position awareness capability has sharply diminished the “where-am-I-now” discipline that was the hallmark of being in the loop. When you don’t have to put any mental effort into ascertaining positional awareness, it’s easy to stop paying attention.

If you are lucky enough to have a good autopilot, it’s great to have “George” tend to the basic flying chores while you — at least in theory — focus on more important things … like positional awareness (see above) and, more broadly, overall situation awareness (e.g., status of weather, fuel, engine indications). The challenge, of course, is to actually direct that freed-up mental and physical capacity to those more important positional and situation awareness considerations. That means overcoming the very human tendency to lapse into “fat, dumb, and happy” complacency … complacency that could cause you to miss something like an abnormal indication on an engine gauge.

Avoiding this potential technology pitfall means finding ways to keep yourself continuously in the loop. For example:

  • Use callouts to maintain positional awareness (e.g., “crossing WITTO intersection, next waypoint is MITER intersection”).
  • Annunciate changes to heading, altitude, and frequency.
  • Record those changes in an abbreviated navigation log. The act of speaking and writing bolsters your awareness.
  • Annunciate any change to navigation source (e.g., “switching from GPS to VLOC”) and autopilot modes. I encourage pilots to read each item on the autopilot status display aloud every time there is a change, stating which modes are armed and which modes are engaged.

These practices can be the backbone of the feedback loop Mr. Musk recommends, but you can make it stronger still by peppering yourself with a steady stream of “howgozit” questions about the flight.

Today’s technology provides the foundation for an unprecedented level of situation awareness. We just have to use it for that purpose, and pay attention in order to repel the all-too-human attraction to technological distractions that could detract from flight safety.

Courtesy: The FAA- Susan Parson is editor of FAA Safety Briefing. She is an active general aviation pilot and flight instructor.

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Signs of Inadequate Coping

The indicators of excessive stress often show as three types of symptoms:

  1. emotional
  2. physical, and
  3. behavioral.

These symptoms differ depending upon whether aggression is focused inward or outward. Those individuals who typically turn their aggressive feelings inward often demonstrate their emotions as symptoms of depression,  preoccupation, sadness and withdrawal. The individual who typically takes out frustration on other people or objects exhibits few physical symptoms. On the other hand emotional symptoms may show up as overcompensation, denial, suspicion, paranoia, agitation, restlessness, defensiveness, excessive sensitivity to criticism, argumentativeness, arrogance, and hostility.

Life Stress Management

There are many techniques available that can help reduce the stress in your life or help you cope with it better. Not all of the following ideas may be the solution, but some of them should be effective for you.

  • Become knowledgeable about stress itself.
  • Take a realistic assessment of yourself.
  • Take a systematic approach to problem solving
  • Develop a life style that will buffer against the effects of stress.
  • Practice behavioral management techniques.
  • Establish and maintain a strong support network.

Cockpit Stress Management

Good cockpit stress management begins with good life stress management. Many of the stress coping techniques practiced for life stress management are not usually practical in flight.  Rather, you must condition yourself to relax and think rationally when stress appears. The following checklist outlines some thoughts on cockpit stress management.

  • Avoid situations that distract you from flying the aircraft.
  • Reduce your workload to reduce stress levels. This will create a proper environment in which to make good decisions.
  • If an emergency does occur, be calm. Think for a moment, weigh the alternatives, then act.
  • Maintain proficiency in your aircraft; proficiency builds confidence. Familiarize yourself thoroughly with your aircraft, its systems, and emergency procedures.
  • Know and respect your own personal limits
  • Do not let little mistakes bother you until they build into a big thing. Wait until after you land, then “debrief’ and analyze past actions.
  • If flying is adding to your stress, either stop flying or seek professional help to manage your stress within acceptable limits.

Courtesy: FAA

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Ships of the Air

The Firsts      Copilot and FE

Pan American was the first airline to use nautical terms. Words like “captain” and “stewards” attracted customers used to luxury ship travel. By the early 1930s, airlines were introducing distinctive uniforms for their employees, and women were entering the ranks of flight attendants. Pilots were given military-style uniforms to reflect their status. Pan American emulated luxurious ocean liner service by calling its flying boats “Clippers” and its pilots “Captains,” and attiring its crews in naval-style uniforms with white hats and navy-blue, double-breasted jackets and rank insignia on the sleeve cuffs. Other airlines followed suit. Many of these customs continue today. While Pan Am and other airlines employed men as stewards, Boeing Air Transport introduced the first female stewards. The first stewardess, a nurse from Iowa, Ellen Church wanted to become an airline pilot but realized that was not possible for a woman in her day. So in 1930, she approached Steve Simpson at Boeing Air Transport with the novel idea of placing nurses aboard airliners. She convinced him that the presence of women nurses would help relieve the traveling public’s fear of flying. Church developed the job description and training program for the first stewardesses. She first flew as a stewardess between Oakland and Chicago, and had only served for 18 months when an automobile accident grounded her. After her recovery, she completed her college degree and returned to nursing.

There is still a newness about air travel, and, though statistics demonstrate its safety, the psychological effect of having a girl on board is enormous.”–comment about the addition of stewardesses from an airline magazine, 1935

Credit: Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum
America by Air–Airline Expansion and Innovation 1927-41

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Study Accident and Incident History Data to Avoid Risks

Learn Lessons from Past Mishaps

Robert Breiling, head of the half-century-old Boca Raton, Florida, safety consulting firm that bears his name, just shakes his head when he reviews the causes of recent accidents and incidents. It’s the same story, different day. “Fifty percent of all business aircraft mishaps still occur during approach and landing.”

The proportion of landing accidents, relative to other phases of flight, actually has increased, Breiling notes. That’s primarily due to a plunge in the percentage of accidents between the final approach fix and runway threshold because of the availability of vertical guidance on more ILS, WAAS and FMS approach procedures.

What galls Breiling is the apparent lack of attention on the part of many pilots to the root causes. “Nothing is being done about it. There also has been a marked increase in single-pilot, owner-flown landing accidents in single-engine turboprops and light jets.”

Breiling’s point is that if people don’t study accident, incident and air safety history, drilling down into the root causes of these events, they’re then destined to repeat the same errors. He’s especially concerned by the single-pilot, owner-operator demographic as it has experienced a disproportionately large increase in accidents in recent years.

Owner-flown high-performance turboprops, such as TBM 700-series aircraft, are involved in a relatively large percentage of loss-of-control accidents, many involving stalls during landing and takeoff, resulting in a sudden, sharp wing drop and subsequent ground strike. Low ceilings and visibility were factors in a significant number of accidents. Use of prescription drugs, known to impair judgment and mental acuity, also was a factor in a significant number of single turboprop fatal accidents. Breiling says, however, that considerably fewer Pilatus PC-12 aircraft are involved in such mishaps, perhaps because a larger percentage of these single-engine turboprops are professionally crewed rather than owner-flown. Single-pilot twin turboprops also suffer a significant number of loss-of-control accidents, runway light misidentification causing off-pavement landings, CFIT mishaps and inadequate pre-flight of fuel quantity remaining. Breiling believes that many of the accidents involving N-registered airplanes are the result of the FAA’s not requiring aircraft type-specific pilot training and qualification in most light generation aviation turboprops. “The exception is the Mitsubishi MU-2. When the FAA created a Special Federal Aviation Regulation that required type-specific qualification and recurrency training, the accident rate dropped to near zero.”

Mishap patterns also emerge for turbofan aircraft. Learjet operators, for instance, appear to have more than their share of altitude busts, based upon looking at FAA Aviation Safety Report System data. Gulfstream IV-series pilots seem to be involved in a notable number of runway excursions. In general, business jets are involved in a disproportionate number of altitude deviations caused by pilot input error, FMS database anomalies or lack of proficiency with high-level automation.

Aviation Safety Reporting System

The FAA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) evolved because its safety team realized that, regardless of the development of new technologies, there would be no substantive improvement in accident, incident and violation rates without operators, pilots and air traffic controllers volunteering to provide critical information about inadvertent human errors and lapses in judgment. Historically, the FAA, along with other government agencies, had a tendency to group such honest mistakes with deliberate criminal wrongdoing. While the individual who made the error might have learned from the mistake, the aviation community, as a whole, couldn’t learn from the event because it was kept secret for fear of retribution.

By developing the ASRS, the FAA acquired a means of collecting, analyzing and acting on reports in a non-punitive manner so that others could learn from individual mistakes. Air traffic controllers, maintainers and ground service providers also can file ASRS reports, thereby contributing to the body of knowledge used to help pilots avoid unnecessary risks, to make improvements to the airspace system and to correct maintenance procedures on the ground.

There are a variety of prepared reports available at the ASRS website, including altitude deviations, air traffic controller reports, records of bird or animal strikes, icing encounter reports and crew fatigue records. Reports also are available on CFIT, GPS problems, RNAV navigation and CRM issues, along with fuel management problems, near-midair collisions and runway incursions, plus upsets, special-use airspace penetrations and wake turbulence encounters.

The GPS report, for instance, shows a pattern of GPS signal disruption near the Mateo (SMO) VOR near Mexico City’s Benito Juarez Airport and also in eastern New Mexico near the White Sands Missile Range. Those snippets warn pilots to be wary of depending solely on GPS for IFR navigation in those areas, to fall back on VOR/DME, DME/DME and/or IRS navigation with appropriate adjustments to navigation performance requirements.

As another example, the RNAV report reveals a continuing pattern of pilots not being fully aware of the capabilities and limitations of FMSes. Certain approach procedures may not be contained in FMS databases, step-down fix altitude crossing restrictions may be missing and vertical guidance may not function as required by the published procedure. Such shortcomings prompt pilots to double check each waypoint and crossing altitudes associated with approach and departure procedures, to study and understand vertical navigation functions and to monitor closely the performance of the automation system to assure that lateral and vertical navigation guidance is in accordance with published procedures.

Few turbine business aircraft are involved in inadvertent special-use airspace incursions, according to ASRS reports. However, one Gulfstream V crew, departing Reagan Washington National Airport northbound, reported violating the P-56 prohibited airspace in Washington, D.C., surrounding the White House due to the lack of ATC issued departure procedures or knowledge of required avoidance procedures as contained in the Airport/Facility Directory Special Notices and as charted on the LAZIR FIVE RNAV departure procedure. A Hawker crew reported inadvertently violating a Presidential TFR around Martha’s Vineyard and landing at the airport without prior permission after departing a non-gateway airport.

ASRS is the accident safety equivalent of a canary in a coal mine. It provides early warning indications of safety risks that, if not checked, can develop into major or fatal accidents.

NTSB Aviation Accident/Incident Database

The NTSB provides one of the most-comprehensive online aircraft accident and incident databases of any reporting agency. It supports search queries including dates, places, aircraft and engine types, scheduled and non-scheduled certificated air carrier, and name of air carrier. These filters enabled business aircraft operators to identify risks associated with the aircraft they operate, the types of operations and procedures they typically fly, and the airports they frequent.

Search for accidents and incidents involving Gulfstream IV series aircraft, for example, and you’ll find several post-landing runway excursion mishaps. These events have occurred in the U.S., Canada, France and Africa, among other regions. The most-common themes in these mishaps are the apparent failure to stabilize the aircraft during landing approach, the apparent failure to execute a go-around or missed approach when it was not safe to land and the apparent willingness of the flight crew to attempt to land the aircraft in unsafe conditions.

The NTSB database also indicates a significant number of maintenance-related issues that caused or contributed to GIV-series accidents or incidents, plus a few instances of flight crews failing to conduct thorough preflight inspections. Case in point: One mishap occurred when a crew, before departing on a mission, forgot to reconnect the nosewheel gear linkage after the aircraft was towed.

Search for mishaps around certain airports and many trends become apparent. Teterboro, for example, experiences plenty of challenging weather conditions, gusting crosswinds and contaminated runway conditions. GIV-series aircraft, among other types of turbofan business aircraft, have been involved in several runway excursions when pilots attempted to land there. Few of these mishaps resulted in fatalities, but several caused major aircraft damage.

NTSB data alerts operators to a significant uptick in accidents in older Learjets, high-performance light jets that now can be purchased for well under $1 million but still require top-notch pilot proficiency skills. On Nov. 9, 2014, for example, a Learjet 35A descended more than 1,200 ft. below the 1,349-ft. glideslope intercept altitude at the outer marker on a second ILS approach to Runway 06 at Freeport’s Grand Bahama International Airport, as the crew attempted to land the aircraft visually in hard rain and obscured visibility conditions. The aircraft struck a crane in a shipyard at 115 ft. AGL, shearing off part of the right wing and fuel tank and causing the aircraft to crash into a garbage mound at a recycling plant next to the shipyard, about 1.9 mi. short of the runway. Both pilots and seven passengers were killed.

In November 2013, the crew of a 1979 Learjet 35, repositioning to Cozumel, Mexico, after a medevac flight from Costa Rica, departed Fort Lauderdale International Airport’s Runway 10L. At 2,200 ft. and 200 KIAS, the crew declared an emergency after the aircraft suffered an engine failure. ATC instructed the crew to fly northbound and climb to 4,000 ft. The crew said it was unable to comply and they attempted to return to the airport in VFR conditions. But the aircraft lost altitude and airspeed, crashing into the Atlantic Ocean at close to 150 KIAS according to ATC radar data. Both crewmembers perished as did a physician and flight nurse.

In December 2012, a 1969 Learjet 25, en route at night from Monterrey to Mexico City – Toluca, lost control at 28,700 ft., climbing to FL 370. It then plunged almost 23,000 ft., crashing into 6,766-ft. elevation mountainous terrain at an 89-deg. angle on Rancho El Tejocote due to undetermined causes. However, the aircraft did have a previous damage history and a record of vibration as airspeed increased to 265 KIAS or Mach 0.74. On at least one occasion, the crew thought the vibration was caused by the stall-warning stick shaker, but when they turned off the system, the vibration continued. Mexican accident investigators suspect that both the vibration and loss of control might have been caused by a horizontal stabilizer control malfunction, but at no time did the crew declare an emergency to air traffic controllers nor did they switch the transponder to squawk 7700.

In August 2008, a Learjet 23 crew attempted a short 25-nm night flight from Puebla, Mexico (MMPB) north to Tlaxcala (MMTA). But Tlaxcala had no runway or approach lights and thus was limited to daylight VFR operations. The crew misjudged their position and suffered a CFIT crash short of the runway in a nearby lake that claimed their lives.

In November 2007, a crew of a Brazilian-registered 1981 Learjet 35A departed São Paulo Campo de Marte Airport for a short hop eastward to Rio’s Santos Dumont Airport. On takeoff, the tower noted that the aircraft pitched up at a steep attitude and then rapidly rolled 90 deg. to the right. The aircraft continued its right turn, descending toward a residential area before rolling left and crashing into houses about 1 mi. from Campo de Marte. In addition to the two crew fatalities, six people on the ground were killed on the ground.

FAA Accident and Incident Data System (AIDS)

This is one of the most difficult databases to exploit because the FAA’s AIDS search engine isn’t user friendly and selection information is limited to report numbers, dates, operators and aircraft types. The FAA says this is an accident and incident database, but the records contain only incidents that didn’t result in major aircraft damage. Most reports are generated both by operators’ maintenance or defect reports and by FAA Form 8020-23 aircraft accident or incident reports.

Searches are limited to one aircraft manufacturer or model at one time. It’s not possible to search for the type of event, such as accident or incident, or the severity of accident damage. Clicking on a link brings up a brief history of the event. But when returning to the search results page the hyperlink doesn’t change color, so it’s easy to lose your place on the results page matrix.

In addition, there are numerous errors in the listings. For example, Dassault Aviation obviously does not manufacture Husky Aircraft. But, the Aviat-A-1B is listed as one of Dassault’s models. As another example, Falcon 10 aircraft are powered by TFE731 turbofans, not GE CF700 engines, the powerplants fitted to legacy Falcon 20 aircraft. Jets don’t create prop wash. Hurricanes don’t accompany snowstorms. Falcon 900 aircraft are not Falcon 50 aircraft, even though the larger jet is grandfathered on the original Falcon 50 type certificate.

Nonetheless, much can be learned from visiting this site. Of the more than 300 Falcon Jets incidents on file, for instance, there only are seven involving Falcon 50 series aircraft. There was only one record of an engine failure, an event that occurred when the center engine failed as the aircraft climbed through 9,000 ft. Lesser events include ruffling the control surface feathers of a Cessna CE421 Golden Eagle with jet blast when leaving the ramp of an FBO, a minor ground wingtip to wingtip collision and hail damage while an aircraft was en route from Broomfield, Colorado, to Oklahoma City.

Falcon 10 aircraft suffered a significant number of TFE731 engine failures, according to AIDS records. Most were handled without incident by proficient flight crews. Falcon 900 series aircraft also suffered a substantial number of TFE731 engine malfunctions, but none resulted in an aircraft accident.

Having excellent short-field capability, Dassault Falcon Jets can use general aviation airports with shorter runways than can some other large-cabin business aircraft. As a result, they may operate on narrow runways and taxiways and in close proximity to light aircraft, fences, unlighted obstacles and wildlife. Runway excursions are rare, according to AIDS records, but there have been several instances of bird or deer strikes, minor ground collisions and even a few general aviation aircraft that have been damaged by jet blast.

Big Picture and Context

It takes substantial time and effort to mine all available databases. To learn the lessons of history applicable to your flight operations, you need to retrieve and review accident and incident reports by aircraft type, by airport and by weather condition, among other variables. Sift through the reports and you’ll find where there are significant risks of engine and systems malfunctions, runway excursions, wildlife strikes and ground collisions.

Probe deeply into accident details and you’ll discover that pilots make fatal errors in judgment due to external pressures. Otherwise preventable accidents occurred when pilots “were dying to complete the flight” because of their perceptions of passenger expectations for mission success. Forensic investigation into the fatal accidents involving a GIV departing Bedford, Massachusetts, in May 2014, a GIV landing mishap at Le Castellet, France, in July 2012 and a GIV runway crash at Bukavu-Kavumu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, among others, all appear to involve flight crews’ yielding to external pressures.

Studying accident and incident histories can help flight departments develop risk assessment and reduction toolkits. For instance, if you’re planning a flight into an airport that has a history of large-cabin aircraft runway excursions in wet and windy conditions, if you’re on a time-sensitive mission with key passengers aboard and if available runway length is an issue for the type of aircraft you operate, then you might want to carefully assess the risks associated with using that landing facility. The average age of the business aircraft fleet, particularly in the light and midsize segments, is getting older. Accident and incident reports clearly indicate that older aircraft are involved in more mishaps than newer aircraft. Pilot training, judgment and proficiency are factors, as are substandard maintenance practices. Pilots of older aircraft tend to miss more discrepancies on preflight inspection that result in mishaps, according to accident records.

In addition, Breiling notes that veteran captains with 10,000 to 15,000 logged hours, or more, may be susceptible to complacency regarding such risk factors, based upon his examination of accident reports. Having flown accident free for their entire careers, they may not appreciate that they’ve been extraordinarily lucky during their careers not to have suffered a mishap. A proactive approach to safety requires operators to be aware of specific aircraft type, airport, weather condition and external pressure risk factors. But the only sure way to avoid risks associated with past accidents and incidents is to study mishap history. The databases are available online at no cost to website visitors. Invest the time to learn from others’ past errors and misfortunes and you’ll substantially increase your immunity from suffering the same problems.

Courtesy: Business & Commercial Aviation, Feb 2, 2015:  Study Accident and Incident History Data to Avoid Risk by Fred George

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Fading Memories

26/6/71, AP-ATO (F-27), Zuberi, LHE-MUX-UET-KHI
On sector MUX-UET we crossed a reciprocal F-27 flight near departure airport (Capt Nasim [Later DC10 & Ground School] & F/O S..A. Aziz) who advised us of a cloudy picture en route and near Quetta. Near destination, captain did not change to QFF setting on the altimeter (regional sea level pressure) but complied when told. The safety altitude was 14500 feet and we were at or slightly above with the reset altimeter in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) over terrain. He started a visual descent and made it but the anxiety induced was high. After arriving at the ramp, the captain was first out to greet the Governor of Baluchistan who was a VIP passenger on our flight, and for whom this foolhardiness was enacted.

LHE= Lahore; MUX = Multan; UET = Quetta (elevation 5287 feet)

30/05/72 AP-AUW (F-27) , Rahat, KHI-Masirah-Salalah-Masirah-KHI

Flight time outbound: 0455
Flight time inbound: 0530

Cockpit crew comprised of Capt S.H. Rahat, Capt F.H.K. Ghori, and First Officer S.M. Husain.

This was a flight conducted to carry Pakistani labour working at Salalah. We landed at Masirah Island probably to discharge some passengers. On departure from Salalah, we were briefed by the airport personnel to avoid the hills on the climb out for there was an insurgency active in the area.

On return sector Masirah—Karachi, the captains were discussing amongst themselves about the depleting fuel situation as a direct route had been taken from Masirah to destination. A ditching possibility was even considered as an alternative. However we landed safely at destination.

Masirah = small island in Arabian Sea & RAF Base (Oman) ; Salalah =  a Oman city

18/4/74 AP-AWZ (B707) , SIN-KUL-CMB-KHI, Ishaq

Cockpit Crew: Captain M. Ishaq, First Officer Idrees Ahmed , First Officer S.M. Husain, Flight Engineer Fazal, and Navigation Officer R.I. James

During the layover at Singapore on this pattern earlier, Navigator James who had also been my instructor at the Ground Training School and had taught navigation briefly, was my mentor to the sights and sounds of that city. He also shepherded me in New York City on one flight with Captain Blake when I was shivering in the cold, and took me shopping to lesser expensive stores. He also introduced to a shop run by the Jewish Community on First Avenue, where the whole PIA crew frolicked periodically.
Extensive weather encountered on sector KUL-CMB. Starting with takeoff in heavy rain with an active thunderstorm and captain instructing First Officer Idrees to monitor his climb out and observe the vertical speed indicator (VSI) for any downward swing. There was a small hill at the end of the runway on the departure end. The radar was on continuously but switched off at times for rest. Continuous flashes of lightning throughout the sector, heavy turbulence, with attendant static discharges on the windshield (St Elmo’s fire). The landing at Colombo was in rain, in clouds to start with, and through an instrument let down (IMC). This flight remains in my memory for a superb display of command.

SIN = Singapore, KUL = Kuala Lumpur; CMB = Colombo; KHI = Karachi

18/3/74, AP-AXA (B707), Israr, KHI-JED-NBO
On departure from Jeddah, the flight plan signed for at Jeddah was left behind on the table. The result was a lot of Jeppesen map activity and interpolation to pass on the estimated times over reporting points (ETA) to the respective radio control centers. Captain didn’t lose his cool.

JED = Jeddah; NBO = Nairobi

15/6/74, AP-AXA (B707), Omair, KHI-ADE-NBO-DAR-NBO
Captain didn’t let me touch the controls on this four sector flight. Must have been really tired at the end. The total flying time was 8.20 hours, not to mention the block times. At Dar-es-Salaam, in honour of visiting dignitary at the airport, Kenneth Kaunda, we witnessed a spectacular African dance festival, simultaneously with an aging DC-3 doing touch and go’s at the airport.

ADE = Aden; NBO = Nairobi; DAR = Dar-es-Salaam

26/5/74, Hashmi, KHI-RWP-PEK , AP-AWV (B707)
Captain was hauled up by Air Traffic Control at Beijing (Peking) at destination for going off the airway. The Chinese air traffic controllers impressed on him to fly the air corridor like a pencil line, which is not possible during turns, such as the turn at Fukang beyond Urumchi, wherer you turn to fly from a north easterly to east-south-east heading, the aircraft swings in a wide arc.

RWP = Rawalpindi (Islamabad Pakistan)10616236_10152262930756701_925435304918937672_n

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Hijacking Attempts in PIA

1. B720 on December 03, 1971(City of Comilla)
2. Fokker Friendship F-27 on Jan 28, 1978
3. B747 on March 2, 1978
4. B720 on March 3, 1981(Zulu Papa)
5. Airbus A 300 on March 12, 1988
6. Fokker Friendship F-27 on May 24, 1998 (City of Bannu)

1. City of Comilla

• December 03, 1971
• Aircraft Type: Boeing 720-040B
• AP-AMG (City of Comilla),
• Pakistan seven one two.
• Sector: London-Paris-Rome-Cairo-Karachi
• Crew 6, Passengers 22, Total on board: 28
• Number of hijackers 1, Victim 0

On December 3, 1971, Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) Boeing 720B was operating flight PK 712 from London to Karachi via Paris, Rome and Cairo with seventeen passengers and six crew members, and arrived at Paris’s Orly Airport on schedule. Five passengers boarded the aircraft at Paris. The last of these was a 28-year old French man named Jean Kay, who was able to enter the aircraft without undergoing normal security procedures. Around 1150 the aircraft doors were closed, and during engine start, Jean Kay slipped into aircraft cockpit. armed with a pistol. He threatened the cockpit crew and asked them to shut down the engines while ordering the aircraft’s fuel tanks to be filled to the maximum. He also demanded 20 tons of medicines to be loaded onto the aircraft for delivery in India for the displaced refugees in the unrest in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). The incident happened a few hours before the Indian invasion of East Pakistan on Dec 3, 1971.

The hijacker also carried a briefcase with two wires sticking out of it claiming it was a bomb. He threatened to blow up the aircraft with the explosives if his demands were not met. He also arranged for a passenger to act as interpreter in French for communicating with the cockpit crew. For much of the day, the French authorities were under the impression that there were two hijackers involved, identifying them as a Frenchman and a Pakistani. Pakistani passengers were terrified when the hijacker announced that he would let everybody off except them at Beirut, Lebanon before heading to India.

Meanwhile the French authorities began arranging delivery of medicines demanded by the hijacker. By 1715 the first truck load of medicines arrived at the airport. While cases of the medicines were being loaded into the aircraft cargo hold, the hijacker allowed a number of elderly passengers and an infant to disembark. He also allowed stewardesses to serve meals to passengers in the aircraft.

The authorities tested the hijacker’s patience by loading medicines slowly and managed to get his permission also for loading some medicines in the rear section of aircraft cabin. Four French policemen disguised as Red Cross workers entered the passenger cabin through aircraft rear door to load medicines. At the same time two more policemen disguised as Air France aircraft technicians entered aircraft cockpit through a trap door. A policeman disguised as Red Cross worker pounced on the hijacker who retaliated by opening fire from his 9mm pistol. The bullet pierced the police officer’s sweater and slightly wounded him in the hand. The hijacker received a number of blows as he scuffled with the policemen who had entered the aircraft through the trap door. They successfully overpowered and seized the hijacker to end the six hour drama. The subdued hijacker was removed from the aircraft and arrested for interrogation. The only weapon carried by him was the 9mm pistol. The briefcase that he claimed was a bomb contained a French Bible, English-French dictionary, a razor, clothes brush and a pair of harmless electrical wires. At the end of the hijacking, the aircraft was cleared to depart Paris.

2. Fokker Hijacking

AP-ALW, Fokker F27 Friendship Mark 400
Sector: Sukkur – Karachi, PK 543

  • Crew: 6
  • Passengers 36
  • Total on board: 42

On January 20,1978 at 0945, AP-ALW departed Sukkur Airport, on a scheduled flight, PK 543 for Karachi. During breakfast service, the hijacker got up from his seat and entered the cockpit. Armed with a revolver and dynamite stick he ordered the crew to divert the aircraft to India. The captain told the hijacker that the aircraft did not have enough fuel for India and it could land at Karachi only. Karachi Airport was informed about the hijacking at 1030 and the hijacked aircraft landed there at 1055. It was parked on Bay 17, some distance away from terminal building, and was surrounded by security personnel including some who hid themselves in bushes near the parking bay.

The first person to contact the hijacker was Chairman PIA Air Marshal (Retd) Malik Nur Khan who went up to the aircraft and communicated with the hijacker through the opened cockpit window. The hijacker said that he was suffering from cancer and demanded Rs. 10 million plus US 1 million dollars, both in cash, for the release of passengers and crew. The hijacker said he needed this money to enjoy the last days of his life which were being cut short by cancer. During the negotiations Nur Khan told the hijacker that PIA could make the arrangements for treating his disease. He also offered himself as a hostage in the aircraft in exchange for the release of passengers and crew. The hijacker rejected those offers.

The hijacker set a deadline to blow up the aircraft along with the hostages by 1500. The authorities informed him that the banks were closed as it was a Friday – a weekly holiday in Pakistan at that time so it was not possible to arrange the cash money demanded by him. In the evening, the hijacker allowed supply of food and water for hostages in the aircraft. Near night time, a total of 14 passengers and an air hostess had been freed by the hijacker. He released them at different times.

The hijacker sent a message to authorities that he wanted to talk to some important person. In response, Nur Khan accompanied by a Pakistan Army officer came closer to the aircraft. The hijacker allowed Nur Khan to enter the aircraft around 2350. After nearly an hour of talks, around 0050 Nur Khan attempted to snatch revolver from the hijacker in the close confines of the cabin. In the ensuing struggle, Nur Khan was shot in the side at point-blank range by the hijacker. By that time, Nur Khan was on top of the hijacker, who was then overpowered by the crew of the aircraft. Nur Khan recovered rapidly from his dangerous wound, and had the distinction of adding the Hilal-e-Shujaat, Pakistan’s highest civil award to the Hilal-e-Jur’at which he had been awarded after the 1965 Pakistan-India war, when he led Pakistan Air Force. He is the only Pakistani citizen to have been awarded both these decorations. The arrested hijacker was identified as Nazir hailing from Mianwali, Pakistan.

3. B747 on March 2, 1978

• Boeing 747-282B, AP-AYV,
• Sector ISB-KHI, PK 301
• Crew: 11 on board,

Cockpit crew:
• Captain Khusro Nawaz Khan
• First Officer Hassan Jafri
• Flight Engineer Khwaja Naseem Ahmed

  • Passengers: 250 on board
  • Total on board: 261
  • Number of hijackers: 1,
  • Victims:0

Description: Flight PK-301 departed from Islamabad at 10:50 AM. About 15 minutes after takeoff a passenger, later identified as Said Hussain sitting in economy class stood up with a live grenade in his hand and announced that he was going to enter the cockpit to ask the pilot to divert flight to New Delhi, India. He ordered passengers not to move. As he turned and started towards the cockpit, a passenger, a retired Pakistan Army Lance Naik, Abdul Malik, got up and grabbed him from behind. In the ensuing scuffle a live grenade in the hijacker’s hand exploded tearing away his wrist. The flying splinters also injured Malik and two other passengers, Israr Ahmed and Sardar Atique sitting near the scene.

Although aircraft cabin fittings were damaged at the place of grenade explosion, luckily the aircraft did not suffer structural damage. The jumbo jetliner safely returned to Islamabad Airport where injured hijacker and passengers were removed from the aircraft and rushed to Combined Military Hospital (CMH) in Rawalpindi.

After undergoing thorough inspection at Islamabad Airport, the Boeing 747 was declared airworthy and allowed to resume its journey to Karachi. The aircraft left Islamabad at 3:00 PM for Karachi.

Chief of the Army Staff and Chief Martial Law Administrator General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq visited injured Abdul Malik at CMH and congratulated him for successfully foiling the hijack attempt. General Zia announced “Nishan-e-Shujaat” to Abdul Malik for his heroism and exemplary courage in dangerous circumstances. “Nishan-e-Shujaat” also carried Rs. 20,000  cash award. In addition, General Zia also announced Rs. 50,000 cash for him. Chairman PIA Air Marshal (Retd) Malik Nur Khan announced a life stipend of Rs. 2,000 per month and travel facilities as enjoyed by PIA employees for Abdul Malik.

4. Zulu Papa

• March 03, 1981, Sector Karachi – Peshawar, PK 326
• Aircraft Type: Boeing 720-030B, AP-AZP
• Crew 9, Passengers 132, Total on board 144
• Number of hijackers 3, Victim 1 passenger

Cockpit crew
• Captain Saeed Khan
• First Officer Junaid Yunus
• Flight Engineer Munawwar

Cabin crew
• Flight Purser Javed Bhatti
• Flight Steward Shakeel Qadri
• Flight Steward Zaffar Ishtiaq
• Flight Steward Muhammad Feroze Maniar
• Air Hostess Naila Nazir – Recipient of the Flight Safety Foundation Heroism Award – Year 1985; Air Hostess Farzana Sharif – After falling ill, freed by hijackers at Damascus Airport, Syria, on March 9.
On March 3, 1981, Pakistan International’s flight PK-326 began as a routine domestic hop from Karachi to Peshawar. In midair three heavily armed men seized the plane, and diverted it to Kabul, Afghanistan. They demanded the release of 92 “political prisoners” from Pakistani jails.

Timeline

• March 4, twenty nine hostages including women, children and sick men were released in Kabul.
• March 5, the released passengers were flown to Peshawar by PIA Fokker F27 Friendship. Another sick male passenger was released by hijackers.
• March 6, the hijacked Boeing 720B sat in Kabul, and when Pakistan’s President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq refused to give in, the hijackers shot a Pakistani diplomat Tariq Rahim in full view of the other passengers and dumped his body on the tarmac.
• March 7, the hijackers released two sick Pakistani men and also forced two American women who wanted to remain on board to leave the aircraft. The two air hostesses were also offered freedom but both of them bravely decided to stay in the aircraft.
• March 8, the aircraft flew to Damascus, Syria, and by the time ordeal ended there on March 15, more than 100 hostages had endured 13 days of tension and squalor. At that time it was the longest hijacking episode in the history.

  • March 9, the hijackers freed an air hostess at Damascus Airport.
  • March 11, relatives of two hijackers were freed and flown from Pakistan to Damascus to plead for the lives of hostages but the hijackers refused to meet them. The gunmen repeatedly threatened to blow up the plane, but were talked into long extensions while negotiations continued by radio with Pakistani and Syrian officials in the Damascus control tower. Finally the hijackers said they would settle for just 55 prisoners but they coupled the concession with a grim warning: they would soon kill the three Americans on board. “Be ready to pick up the bodies,” they told the tower. Just twenty minutes before the deadline President Zia gave in, ordering that the prisoners be flown to sanctuary in Libya. “It’s over,” said Pakistani negotiator Sarfraz Khan.
  • But it wasn’t over. First, Pakistani authorities said they could not trace one of the 55 prisoners. And some of the others didn’t want to leave Pakistan.
  • March 15, a PIA Boeing 707 flew 54 prisoners from Karachi to Aleppo, Syria. After arriving at Aleppo, the prisoners were transferred to a smaller Syrian Air aircraft for flight to Libya. Then as the Syrian aircraft carrying the released prisoners was approaching Tripoli, Libya suddenly announced that it had changed its mind about granting asylum to the hijackers and their friends. The prisoners’ plane had nowhere to go, and the hostages’ lives were again in jeopardy. After circling Tripoli Airport, the plane flew to Athens, where officials refused to let it land until the desperate pilot radioed that he had no more fuel and was about to ditch into Aegean Sea. The aircraft was then allowed to refuel in Athens. Finally, Syria announced that it would take in the prisoners and the hijackers, and the gunmen gave up.The Syrian aircraft with the released passengers on its return flight to Syria landed at Damascus Airport where the hijacked aircraft was parked. After the arrival of the political prisoners at Damascus Airport, the three young hijackers, all dressed in shalwar kameez, emerged, gun barrel first, from the rear door. They surrendered their weapons to the Syrian officials and drove off with them to the luxurious Damascus Airport Hotel & Casino where the political prisoners also had been accommodated. After the departure of the hijackers, the freed passengers began leaving the aircraft from the front door. The passengers were followed by the crew members. The captain was the last person to come out of the plane. The long flight was over.

Another PIA crew brought AP-AZP back to Pakistan from Damascus. The aircraft was ferried to Karachi by Capt. Syed Irtiza and First Officer Ahsan Aftab Bilgrami. It landed at Karachi Airport on March 16, at 1716. The freed passengers and crew members were flown to Peshawar on March 18 by PIA from Jeddah, where they had been sent by the Government of Pakistan to perform Umrah after their release in Damascus.

AP-AZP was withdrawn from use and retired in April 1981. Later it was put on display at Jabees Funland in New Clifton, Karachi where it became source of joy and happiness for young children. A few years later, it was removed from the park and sold to scrap metal dealers.

1985’s Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) Heroism Award was presented to hijacked aircraft’s Air Hostess Naila Nazir for her handling of the tense and dangerous situation during 13 days of the ordeal. At that time, Naila was 19 years-old and had joined the airline just two months ago. The hijackers offered Naila to leave the aircraft at Damascus Airport but she decided to stay with the rest of passengers and crew till the end during which she took good care of passengers.
The FSF Heroism Award was established in 1968 to recognize civil aircraft crew members or ground personnel whose heroic actions exceeded the requirements of their jobs. The selection of the ‘FSF Heroism Award’ recipients is determined by the degree of personal risk involved in the heroic act; the nature of the courage, perseverance and other personal characteristics that were displayed; and the degree to which the heroism was outside normal levels of duty and ability.

5. Airbus A 300

• Sector: Karachi-Quetta-Lahore, PK 320
• March 12, 1988, Airbus A300B4-203, AP-BCJ
• Crew: 13, Passengers: 143, Total on board: 156
• Hijacker: 1, Victims: 0

PK-320 left Karachi on schedule for flight to Lahore via Quetta. While it was some 100 miles from Quetta, a passenger seated in the First Class left his seat and went into the rest room. After coming out from there, he headed for the cockpit, and with a revolver ordered the pilots to divert the flight to Afghanistan or India. At that time the cockpit door was open and a passenger who was present inside the cockpit got hold of the hand of the hijacker in which he was holding the revolver and pushed him out of the cockpit. Before the hijacker could control his balance he was grabbed by air guard Liaquat. While the hijacker and air guard struggled to overpower each other, the hijacker fired a number of shots, three of which hit the air guard. The hijacker also got hit by a bullet fired by him.

A number of passengers including PIA General Manager Sardar Muhammad Aslam also arrived at the scene to assist the air guard and punched, kicked and hit the hijacker. The hijacker who was wearing shalwar kameez and a large turban was subdued and the crew tied his hands and legs with strings and turban that he was wearing. Within five minutes the whole situation was brought under control. The pilot through an announcement informed passengers that the hijacker has been overpowered and there was nothing to worry.

Luckily the bullets did not damage aircraft airframe.The air guard received medical treatment from two doctors present on board the aircraft, and the bullet wounds were not life threatening. The Airbus landed at Quetta Airport on schedule. At Quetta, the three wounded persons, i.e. hijacker, air guard and PIA General Manager were rushed to the hospital. The PIA General Manager was injured when he joined other passengers to overpower the hijacker. The hijacker was identified as 28-year old Abdul Mannan Achakzai.

All passengers disembarked the aircraft there and underwent a security screening process. Baggage and cargo items were also removed from the aircraft for checks. About five hours later, after a thorough inspection of passengers and aircraft, PK-320 was cleared to depart for Lahore.

6. City of Bannu

• May 24, 1998
• Fokker F27 Friendship Mark 200 , AP-BCZ, “City of Bannu,”
• Pk554
• Sector Turbat-Gwadar-Karachi

Crew: 5
Passengers: 28,
Total on board: 33
Number of hijackers 3
Victims: 0

Flight PK-554 departed Turbat Airport at 4:40 PM for flight to Karachi via Gwadar. The F27 at that time was carrying a total of 29 passengers including three traveling to Gwadar. At 5:35 PM it landed at Gwadar Airport where three Gwadar-bound passengers disembarked. During Fokker’s 20 minute stay at Gwadar Airport, two passengers boarded the aircraft for Karachi. The aircraft carrying 27 passengers and 5 crew members departed Gwadar at 5:55 PM for its final destination Karachi, where it was expected to land at 6:55 PM.

After takeoff from Gwadar, a young man got up from his seat and moved towards the aircraft cockpit. An Air Hostess tried to stop the man from entering the cockpit but she was pushed away. He entered the cockpit and with a pistol ordered the pilots to divert the flight to Jodhpur, India. He was joined by two colleagues in their quest to hijack the aircraft. An announcement was made by the pilot to inform the passengers that aircraft has been hijacked and would now be flown to India. The pilot managed to secretly set the aircraft transponder to the hijack code for conveying the distress signal and alert air traffic controllers on the ground. The aircraft on Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority’s (CAA) and Pakistan Air Force’s (PAF) radars appeared to deviate from its flight path and head for Indian air space. Two PAF F-7 supersonic fighter interceptor aircraft that were on a routine Combat Air Patrol (CAP) in the area began monitoring the hijacked flight and escort it. The pilot of flight PK-554 told the hijackers that the aircraft was running out of fuel and he would land at Bhuj Airport in India. The shrewd pilot then landed the aircraft at Hyderabad Airport in Pakistan but told the hijackers it was at Bhuj Airport in India and needed refueling. The hijackers did not understand English, so it was possible for the cockpit crew and airport authorities to discuss the situation and plan their actions in that language. The authorities at Hyderabad Airport also switched off the airport lights to prevent the hijackers from identifying the airfield. One of the three hijackers stayed inside the cockpit, another positioned himself near the main door of the aircraft and the third roamed through the aircraft cabin. All three were wearing shalwar kameez.

A number of Pakistani government and security officials pretending to be Indian officials started talks with the hijackers. The hijackers demanded a meeting with Pakistan’s High Commissioner in India to present their demands. The hijackers were unhappy over reports of the Pakistan’s Government plan to conduct nuclear tests in Baluchistan. They sought assurance that the tests would not be conducted on that soil. The hijackers also complained against inappropriate distribution of funds for Baluchistan and lack of humanitarian assistance for areas affected by floods in Makran.

The hijackers threatened to kill crew members and passengers if their demands were not fulfilled. One of the hijackers shouted that he would blow up the aircraft and one of his partners displayed a bag that he claimed contained explosives. Meanwhile, Pakistani officials acting as Indians continued holding talks with the hijackers and during this process assessed the overall situation for planning the action to overpower the hijackers. The aircraft also received food and water for passengers and crew. Around 11:35 PM, the hijackers sent the aircraft’s Ground Engineer Sajjad Chaudhry to get water and food and ask the airport authorities to refuel the aircraft for flight to New Delhi. The Ground Engineer returned to the aircraft with food and water. At night, the aircraft’s lights went off and the cabin became hot. In the darkness the terrified children began crying and shouting, and at that point the hijackers allowed what they thought was an Indian aircraft technician on board ( actually he was a Pakistan Army officer) to leave the aircraft. After the disguised man left the aircraft around 2:50 AM, the Pakistani officials acting as Indians managed to persuade the hijackers to free women, children and infants on board the aircraft. While women and children were getting down from the aircraft, other passengers also tried to get out and in the melee that followed the hijackers were easily overpowered by the disguised Pakistanis including men belonging to Pakistan Army and Police. The three hijackers were identified as Pakistan nationals Sabir, Shabbir and their leader Shahswar. Two pistols were recovered from their possession. A special PIA F27 flight transported freed passengers from Hyderabad to Karachi where it landed at 7:55 AM on May 25. Later, the released aircraft was also flown to Karachi where it landed at 9:30 AM on the same day.

Courtesy of : historyof pia.com

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